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Abstract
We study the political economy of allocation decisions within a major state in-
vestment bank. Our focus is the European Investment Bank (EIB) – “The Bank
of the EU” – which is the largest multilateral lending (and borrowing) institution
in the world. We collect (and make available) information on the regions of ori-
gin of about 500 national representatives at the EIB’s Board of Directors – the
decisive body for loan approvals – since its foundation in 1959 and show that a
representative’s appointment increases the probability of her sub-national region
receiving a loan by about 17 percentage points. This “home-bias” effect is driven
by large loans financing infrastructure projects. We provide several pieces of evi-
dence, which are consistent with the hypothesis that home-bias lending may lead
to resource misallocation, however we cannot conclusively demonstrate this case of
economic inefficiency.
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1 Introduction
We study the political economy of loan allocation decisions of the European Investment
Bank (EIB) or “the bank of the European Union”. We ask whether these lending decisions
made by the powerful Board of Directors of the EIB, which consists of representatives of
European Union (EU) Member States, purely follow the economic and EU integration
related goals set by the bank, or if they can be explained instead by political or personal
motives of the Member State representatives running the bank. Beyond the direct im-
portance of understanding what determines the lending of the world’s largest multilateral
lending (and borrowing) institution, this work may provide additional insights into the
question of how the interplay between the incentives of non-elected officials and national
interests shapes the policies of international organizations.
With the emergence of the European project, the EIB has gained importance with
near exponential rates of growth in lending over the last few decades (see, Figure 1-a).
In 2017, new commitments by the EIB in Europe summed up to around 76 billion Euros
(EIB 2017b), or about half of the EU’s annual budget (European Commission 2018).
The EIB together with the European Fund for Strategic Investments also serves as an
important investment instrument in anti-cyclical economic policy in Europe, with current
debates on the economic governance of the Eurozone often highlighting an even larger
future role for the EIB (EIB 2015b, 2018).
There are important reasons to believe that state investment banks like the EIB
can serve the general interest of society. Traditional arguments stress the market failure
fixing roles of these banks (Stiglitz 1994), while more recent views celebrate the capacity
of these banks to invest in large and risky innovative projects, which may potentially
have positive spillovers across the whole economy (Mazzucato and Penna 2016). The
hopes of European policy makers to secure funding for large public investment projects,
which the private markets fail to provide, are often tied to the EIB since the small
EU budget typically cannot afford to finance these (Clifton et al. 2018). However, a
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potential trade-off is whether this type of government intervention is prone to other forms
of governance failure such as rent-seeking by the technocrats running the bank. Since
the EIB is not under democratic scrutiny directly, another hope is that this financing
instrument would be largely free of the constraints of distributive politics such as pork
barrel type of spending. This goes in contrast to the EU budget, which has too often
served as a tool to please political and national appetites.1 On the other hand, the absence
of electoral incentives and related constraints of political accountability may open other
opportunities for decision makers at the EIB to discriminate in lending decisions such as
based on their personal gains or preferences.
Our specific focus is the Board of Directors, which is the decisive body for the ap-
proval of loans at the EIB. This body includes a Director nominated by each EU Member
State and one from the European Commission. We hand-collect data on the careers of the
population of all 470 Directors with the aim of measuring the connections of Directors at
the level of European sub-national regions as far as these can be captured by the Directors’
work and education experience. We then match this data of Directors’ regions of origin
and their tenure at the EIB to administrative project-level data of EIB loans granted since
the foundation of the Bank in 19592 again aggregated at the level of European regions.3
Using difference-in-difference and distributed lag models we provide evidence supporting
the hypothesis that lending is more likely to flow to the home regions of Directors upon
appointment at the Board compared to other regions. This phenomenon, that we label
“home-bias” effect, amounts to an average 17 percentage points (or 40% of the sample
mean) increase in the likelihood of receiving a loan. Interestingly, the home-bias effect is
entirely driven by a relatively small sub-set of very large infrastructural mega-projects.
1See, e.g., Gehring and Schneider (2018) and Aksoy (2010) who show that, respectively, the EU
Commissioner for Agriculture and the EU President are able to influence the budget allocation in favor
of their home countries.
2We focus on direct project loans by the EIB. Projects that cost at least 25 million Euros qualify for
this type of loans.
3We describe the data, provide access to it as well as explain the programs we use for estimating our
baseline findings in an Online Data Appendix. This Appendix is at the end of this document and can
be accessed by following this link: http://ftp.zew.de/pub/persons/ZarehAsatryan/EIB/.
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One crucial question regarding the home-bias effect that we document is whether
these discriminatory lending practices facilitate economic efficiency or whether they result
in inefficient misallocation of resources. There are several potential explanations behind
the home-bias effect, all of which predict a larger flow of transactions into the home
regions,4 but with divergent predictions on the economic value of these transactions. On
the one hand, Directors may have a personal gain in transferring resources to their home
regions. The EIB’s rules of “Code of Conduct for the Members of the Board of Directors”
(EIB 2012) reveal the potential existence of issues of this nature by preventing former
Board members to “lobby with members of the EIB governing bodies and Bank staff
for their business, client or employer” within six months after leaving the Board. We
label this mechanism as favoritism. The EIB is different from democratic contexts where
politicians have electoral motives, however, in addition to personal gains due to favoritism,
the directors may also simply have social preferences towards their home regions. For
example, Transparency International EU (2016) points out that senior managers of the
EIB have a lot of freedom to favor their home countries without citing the reasons to do
so. Either way, this favoritism or preference based discrimination in lending practices will
likely lead to resource misallocation. On the other hand, Directors may be able to reduce
information asymmetries between the EIB and the borrowers in their region of origin,
thereby creating more value for both parties. For example, an informed Director may be
able to reduce search costs or relax the costly needs of enforcement effort by identifying
the set of projects most worthy of investments.
Five pieces of evidence speak against the hypothesis that loans flowing to home re-
gions are less prone to problems of asymmetric information than lending to other regions.
First, we study a sub-sample of Directors who change their work region during or after
their service at the EIB. While sending money to their pre-EIB regions can be a mix of
the information and favoritism channels, we show weak evidence that the resources are
4One exception in the literature documenting positive effects of home-bias in various outcomes is
Fisman et al. (2019) who shows that bureaucrats sharing a hometown or college connection with an
incumbent member of the Chinese Politburo are actually penalized in their probability to be promoted
to the Politburo.
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sent to the post-EIB regions during the end of the Board membership, which is likely
to be due to favoritism assuming that the Directors cannot have a priori information
about the new region. Second, as laid out by Fisman et al. (2017), Persson and Zhu-
ravskaya (2016), Rajan (1992) the degree of information a Director has about a region
(measured by her length of experience at the region) should be positively correlated with
the amount of home-bias lending. Third, following Cornell and Welch (1996), Fisman
et al. (2017) we hypothesize that more informed lending practices should increase the
variance of loan sizes because with more more precise signals the Director’s prior beliefs
of borrower quality have a wider distribution. Our evidence does not support either
of these hypotheses. Fourth, our evidence that the home-bias phenomenon is entirely
driven by infrastructural mega-projects may be more consistent with favoritism rather
than the informational channels since it is likely that there is already much common
information about such project as compared to smaller and more sophisticated projects.
This finding is also in line with Do et al. (2017), Persson and Zhuravskaya (2016) who
show that favoritism in Vietnam and China, respectively, operates through expenditures
on construction infrastructure rather than social expenditures such as on education. Fi-
nally, following Persson and Zhuravskaya (2016), we study the timing of formation of
the home-bias and show that the additional lending is flowing to regions of Directors’
workplace rather than their education regions, which may speak against the hypothesis
that favoritism is driven by social preferences rather than by personal gain.
Overall, our evidence is consistent with the view that the regional home-bias at
the EIB is driven by the favoritist practices of its Directors thus leading to resource
misallocation and economic inefficiency. However, we ultimately fail to reject that other
efficiency-enhancing factors can be responsible for the home bias effect.5 We also note
5Several papers try to isolate the favoritism and information channels in different contexts. For
example, Khwaja and Mian (2005) find that politically connected firms in Pakistan borrow 45% more
than their non-connected peers. By studying the outcomes of these loans they show that the connected
firms have 50% higher default rates. Haselmann et al. (2018) show that German firms whose CEOs are
in elite social networks with bank representatives receive more lending. Although the immediate terms of
loans such as interest rates or defaults that connected firms receive are not different from those of control
firms, the paper shows that the ex-post loan performance as measured by return on loans is substantially
lower for connected firms. Unfortunately, data unavailability on the performance of EIB loans prohibits
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that our findings are based on observable connections that are self-reported on CVs of
Directors. Unobservable connections may play an important role, but we cannot draw
any conclusions on these. The institutional setup and a number of tests such as showing
the absence of pre-trends support the view that the region of origin of a Director is
plausibly exogenous to her nomination decision. However, we cannot rule out potential
region-specific time-variant unobservables that are correlated both with the probability
to lend and the nomination decision. One major candidate is regional demand for loans,
which may in principle respond to the nomination decision.
This paper contributes to several strands of literature. First, it is related to work on
the political economy of international organizations, which focuses on the United Nations
(UN), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB), among others.
This literature typically finds that political economy factors are major determinants be-
hind important decisions at these institutions (for a review, see, Dreher and Lang 2019).
For example, a number of studies show that the probability of receiving IMF and WB
loans (as well as the leniency of the attached conditions) is positively correlated with
the recipient countries’ voting behavior at the international arena, such as whether they
vote in line with the US or G7 countries at the UN Security Council (see, among others,
Barro and Lee 2005, Dreher and Sturm 2012, Dreher et al. 2009, Kaja and Werker
2010, Kilby 2009, Moser and Sturm 2011, Stone 2004, Sturm and de Haan 2005). This
literature on international organizations has paid surprisingly little attention to the EIB,
which is surprising given the size of the Bank. Clifton et al. (2018), Robinson (2009) and
Mertens and Thiemann (2019) are the few papers on EIB that we are aware of. These
papers describe the Bank, its functions, and evolution using a mix of qualitative and
quantitative methods. Our contribution is to bridge this gap.
us from performing such an exercise. Another strategy is used by Fuchs and Gehring (2017). The paper
first documents that rating agencies more favorably rate the sovereign bonds of their home countries.
However, a test that compares countries where information is likely to be abundant to countries where
information is not as easily accessible suggests that home biased ratings are probably not driven by the
informational advantages of agencies towards their homes.
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Second, the paper adds to the related literature studying the politics behind different
financing instruments of the EU (for general reviews, see, Alesina et al. 2005, Baldwin
and Wyplosz 2012). In particular, studies find that political factors, such as voting and
proposal powers of the Member States in the EU, but also other international organiza-
tions, systematically affect the allocation of the EU Budget (see, among others, Aksoy
2010, 2012, Bachtler and Mendez 2007, Bodenstein and Kemmerling 2012, Gehring
and Schneider 2018, Mikulaschek 2018, Schneider 2013).6 Our contribution to this
literature is to document the existence of home-bias at the regional level in addition to
the previously found biases at the national level. This is important since regional home-
bias may have very different implications. In addition, the failure to account for regional
home-bias of EU level politicians might have led the previous papers to wrongly attribute
these type of bias to national bias since the home regions of politicians are often situated
within their home countries.7
Third, the paper contributes to a recent strand of mostly development-related re-
search on regional favoritism. The literature shows that political leaders systematically
give favors to their ethno-linguistic groups (Dickens 2018, Franck and Rainer 2012,
Kramon and Posner 2013, 2016, Kudamatsu 2007, Miquel 2007) and their regions of
origin (Do et al. 2017, Dreher et al. 2016) in terms of higher federal transfers and
public goods, or as observed in higher intensity night light data more generally (Hodler
and Raschky 2014). Golden and Min (2013) presents an overview of this literature. Fol-
lowing several recent extensions of these results to democracies (see, e.g., Baskaran and
Lopes da Fonseca 2018, Carozzi and Repetto 2016, Dahan and Yakir 2019, Fabre and
Sangnier 2017, Fiva and Halse 2016, for evidence on Germany, Italy, Israel, France and
Norway, respectively), we show that favoritism also takes place in institutionally mature
environments.
6Nevertheless, there is evidence that the EU budget has positive albeit very small economic effects
(Becker et al. 2010), which are only concentrated in areas with high levels of human capital and quality
of government (Becker et al. 2013).
7For a comparison between home-bias in intranational versus home-bias in international trade, see
Wolf (2000).
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Finally, this paper is related to a field in financial economics studying whether politi-
cal considerations influence credit allocations of government-owned banks. This literature
finds that, unlike private banks, lending by government-controlled banks is likely to follow
political business cycles and to flow to electorally important districts both in advanced
(e.g., Chavaz and Rose (2019) and Englmaier and Stowasser (2017) with evidence on US
and Germany, respectively) and in less developed countries (among others, see Carvalho
2014, Cole 2009, Dinc 2005, for evidence on Brazil, India and a set of 36 countries,
respectively).8
2 Institutional Setting and Data
The European Investment Bank: The EIB was founded in 1958 following the Treaty
of Rome. One of the important aims of the Bank from the very start was to support
the EU in reaching its goals of integration. The annual sum of signed loans has risen
substantially over time from 34 million Euros in 1959 to around 77 billion Euros in 2015,
this positive trend kicking off especially from the 1980s.9 The EIB mainly lends to EU
Member States (90% of signed loans in 2017, EIB 2017b), but also to other countries
all over the world. Today, the bank is the largest multilateral lending (and borrowing)
institution in the world. It is the main EU funding source for some policy areas like
transport, and, for some countries, EIB funds are larger than resources flowing from EU
regional policies (Robinson 2009). A significant portion of the funds goes to poorer
regions (e.g. in 2015, 26.5% of EIB loans co-financed cohesion objective funds from the
EU).10
Applicants for a loan can be from all levels of government, as well as private and
public firms. Projects that cost less than 25 million Euros are disbursed via intermediate
8A related field studies whether political connections of firms influence their opportunities to attract
lending (among others, see Faccio et al. 2006, Haselmann et al. 2018, Khwaja and Mian 2005, Sapienza
2004).
9Own calculations based on http://www.eib.org/en/projects/loan/list/index.htm
10http://www.eib.org/projects/priorities/cohesion_and_convergence/index.htm
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banks. As the Bank of the EU, the EIB generally finances projects that are in line
with the economic policy objectives of the EU. Currently, some of the main priorities of
the Bank include support to innovation activities, small and medium sized enterprises,
infrastructure projects, and projects enhancing sustainable environment.11
Figures 1 and 2 (a) present the size and targets of the EIB project loans. Sub-figure
1(a) shows that the loans have been growing substantially in size over time. Sub-figure
(b) shows the distribution of loans across sectors. Transport, industry, and energy are
the largest sectors. When looking at the distribution of the total amount of loans over
countries in Sub-figure (c), the major shareholders of the Bank seem to receive the largest
shares of the EIB loans. Sub-figure (d) shows the average annual share of EIB loans over
GDP from 1995 to 2015 for EU Member States. On average over this period, the largest
recipients are Portugal and Cyprus, receiving funding amounting to nearly 1% of their
GDP, while the Netherlands gets the least with about 0,1% of GDP. Finally, Figure 2 (a)
shows the geographical distribution of loans on the regional level. This map demonstrates
substantial heterogeneity across regions with the distribution being skewed to the poorer
Southern regions of the EU.
Board of Directors and the approval of loans: Each EU Member State appoints
one representative Director while an additional Director is nominated by the Commission.
Moreover, today, there are 19 Alternate Directors. Most of the Directors are leading
bureaucrats in their respective country, e.g., in the Ministry of Finance. Being a Director
at the EIB is not a full-time job, they still follow their main occupation and only travel
occasionally to the EIB in Luxembourg. The Directors are appointed for a period of five
years and meet at least six times a year to decide on loan allocations. The Alternate
Directors are also present at the meetings and support the Full Directors. The four big
11http://www.eib.org/projects/cycle/applying_loan/index.htm. In the 2017 Activity Report,
the EIB describes some show-case examples: A project on innovation developed an in-organic substitute
for coconut shells as supercapacitors. A microfinance firm in Luxembourg has been part of the support for
SMEs. The expansion of electric cars in Paris was part of the infrastructure dimension and environmental
projects included the rewilding of a region in Bulgaria (EIB 2017a).
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Figure 1: Descriptives on the size, evolution, and distribution of EIB loans
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(c) By country
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(d) Average share in GDP
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Note: All figures were manually constructed from the EIB data taken from
http://www.eib.org/en/projects/loan/list/index.htm. Data on GDP is in
current prices from 1995 to 2015 is taken from Eurostat.
countries Germany, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom have two Alternates each,
while all other countries share one Alternate in groups of two to eight.
A loan is approved when at least one third of the Board members is in favor of the
project and when these members represent at least 50% of the subscribed capital. The
shareholders are the Member States. Each country’s share corresponds to the relative
size of the country’s GDP in the EU at the time of joining the EU. Germany, France,
9
Figure 2: Distribution of EIB loans across European regions
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Note: Map (a) plots the total sum of EIB loans in million Euros that the respective region
received within the period 1959-2015. Data source: http://www.eib.org/en/projects/loan/
list/index.htm. Map (b) plots the share of years a region had (at least one) representative at
the EIB Board of Directors within the period 1959-2015.
Italy, and the United Kingdom12 each hold 16.1% of the total shares (EIB 2015a). With
such significant weight, these four countries together can veto decisions.
Data on Directors’ careers: The treated regions are defined based on a coding of
the CVs of the EIB’s Board of Directors. Our sample includes 470 Board members from
1959 to 2015, including 254 full and 216 alternate members.13 Sub-figure (a) of 4 shows
the length of the mandates of the Board members. The large bulk of Directors stayed
two or three years in the Board. Sub-figure (b) represents a time line starting in 1959
showing the amount of Directors appointed to (positive values) and leaving (negative
values) the Board per year. Finally, in Figure 2 (b), we show the distribution of our
treatment variable over space by plotting the share of years each region had one or more
representative at the EIB Board. 84 regions are treated at least once. Comparing Figures
2 (a) and (b), we can see a slight correlation of “darker” areas, i.e., between regions that
have been treated more intensely and regions receiving more loans. Overall, the treated
12Currently, a big debate is taking place on how to replace the UK’s capital share if the UK is leaving
the EU as discussed in the Financial Times (Financial Times 2018).
13To get an idea how the CVs look like, the official EIB website provides with the CVs
of the current Board of Directors: https://www.eib.org/en/about/governance-and-structure/
statutory-bodies/board_of_directors/index.htm
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regions receive a share of 24% of the total project volume. 435 out of the 470 Directors
come from regions including the capital city. 109 Directors work in lagging regions as
defined by the regions receiving money from the European Cohesion Fund.14
We code the CVs of Board members in terms of the region they have worked when
joining the EIB Board, and separately for the region where they obtained their highest
degree of education. It would have been useful to also study the birth regions of Board
members, however, such data is not available for privacy reasons. In the end, our preferred
treatment variable is the work region dummy since we have complete information on this
measure.15 For this variable, we have 36 regions that have been treated at some point
in time. 19% of the overall loan volume are received by these 36 work regions. The
education region, on the other hand, is missing for a substantial share of members that
may introduce a downward bias in our estimates (since missing information is coded as
0, thus inflating the control group upwards, assuming that there is a home-bias in EIB
lending).16 We use the education definition in Section 5 to study whether the timing
when preferences towards home are realized matter for the interpretation of our results.
Throughout the paper, we exclude the Brussels region, as it is quite a special region
in the European context. being the home of many European institutions.
Data on EIB lending: The data on EIB loans goes back to 1959 and is publicly
available on the website of the EIB.17 The website provides information on the size of
the loan, the country, the sector, and the exact date when the contract was signed.
14Regions are eligible for the Cohesion Fund in case their gross national income per inhabitant is lower
than 90% of EU average.
15The EIB provided us with 157 CVs. In these CVs, the Directors voluntarily list the prior workplaces
and other information they wish to provide to the public. We then coded the regions manually from
this information. For the remaining Directors, we took information on their work region from the EIB
annual reports available in the Historical Archives of the European Union (https://archives.eui.eu/
en/fonds/30462?item=BEI). We also tried to complement the education region manually via a Google
search, which increased the number of available education regions to 262.
16Figure 3 shows the share of Board members for whom we know the respective work and education
regions.
17http://www.eib.org/en/projects/loan/list/index.htm
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Figure 3: Availability of treatment variable
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Figure 4: EIB members’ length of mandate over time
(a) EIB members’ length of mandate
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
0 5 10 15 20
Number of years
(b) Joining and leaving the EIB Board
-4
0
-2
0
0
20
40
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
year
Information on the region (either NUTS 1, NUTS 2 or NUTS 3) was provided to us by
the EIB directly. This enables us to conduct a detailed analysis on a sub-national level.
Table 1 shows the availability of the loan data. Full information is available on the
country level. Here, the total size of loans amounts to nearly 787 billion Euros. The num-
ber and total size of projects decrease the more we zoom into countries, i.e., as our focus
becomes confined to smaller administrative units. One reason for less observations in the
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smaller administrative units is that some projects are allocated on higher administrative
units and we do not know whether and how the money is distributed among sub-regions.
Table 1: EIB loans aggregated to different region definitions
Level Sum in billion EUR No. of items No. of projects
Country 787.40 15,932 6,495
NUTS 1 578.71 14,010 5,366
NUTS 2 476.10 12,709 4,830
NUTS 3 285.25 7,917 3,443
Other data: Regional data on control variables is taken from the European Regional
Database (ERD) by Cambridge Econometrics. The dataset starts in 1980, however, Cen-
tral and Eastern European countries18 as well as Malta and Cyprus are only available
from 1990 onward. Our control variables are GDP, population size, hours worked, com-
pensation of employees and gross fixed capital formation. Summary statistics of these
and all other variables are collected in Table 2. For most countries we rely on the NUTS
2 region. For Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, we use the NUTS 3 region to get some
sub-national variation, as their NUTS 2 regions correspond to the whole countries. For
Cyprus and Luxembourg, even the NUTS 3 region corresponds to the entire country, thus
leaving no variation for us to explore given our country-by-time fixed effects.
3 Methodology
3.1 Difference-in-differences
We estimate the following difference-in-differences (diff-in-diff) model:
EIB loansijt = α1 + β1 ·Homeijt + γ1 ·Xijt + φt + ψij + µtj + ijt (1)
The index i stands for the region in country j, and year t. EIB loansijt, our out-
come variable, is either a dummy to measure the extensive margin of receiving an EIB
18Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia
13
Table 2: Summary statistics of variables
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max Start Source
EIB loan dummy 16,587 0.2503 0.433 0 1 1959 EIB
EIB loans in million EUR 16,587 28.62 99.11 0 1874 1959 EIB
EIB loans over sum of EIB loans in year t 16,296 .0034 .0272 0 1 1959 EIB
EIB loans over GDP 9,286 .0014 .0040 0 .0733 19801 EIB
EIB loans interquartile range 16,587 6385551 3.13e+07 0 9.85e+08 1959 EIB
EIB loans standard deviation 2,418 3.22e+07 4.89e+07 0 6.97e+08 1959 EIB
Capital city * joining EU 16,587 0.0490 0.216 0 1 1959
GDP in billion EUR 9,286 35.62 45.20 0.271 565.0 19801 ERD
GDP p.c. t− 6 to t− 1 9,284 19032 10351 1708 97112 19801 ERD
Population in thousand 9,284 1691 1475 22.76 12070 19801 ERD
Thousand hours worked per employee 8,721 1.717 0.204 1.293 2.456 19801 ERD
Compensation per employee in thousand EUR 8,761 22.68 10.71 1.162 105.7 19801 ERD
Gross fixed capital formation in million EUR 8,771 7768 9262 46.97 124611 19801 ERD
Home region dummy work 16,587 0.0525 0.223 0 1 1959 EIB, EU Archives
Home region dummy education 16,587 0.0458 0.209 0 1 1959 EIB, EU Archives
Capital share in % 16,587 8.95 9.89 0 30 1959 EIB, EU Archives
1For Eastern European countries, the variables are only available since 1990.
Notes: ERD stands for European Regional Database.
loan, or the natural logarithm of the amount of EIB loans. To combine extensive and
intensive margin analyses, we use a Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) model
with two different dependent variables: the loans-GDP-ratio and the share of loans a
region received in total amount of loans in a given year.
Homeijt is our main variable of interest. This variable measures whether a region
had at least one representative at the EIB’s Board of Directors at a given point in time.
Region-year observations are coded as treated (Homeijt) whenever a person currently
part of the Board either studied or is currently working in the given region (as reported
in the Board of Directors’ CVs). With 28 Full Directors representing one EU Member
State each, one Full Director from the Commission, and 19 Alternate Directors, who
are elected for a term of five years, we have a good degree of both cross-regional and
cross-time variation in the treatment variable (see Figure 2).
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Xijt is a vector of control variables.
19 We also include region fixed effects (ψij),
time fixed effects (φt), and country-by-year fixed effects (µtj). These three-way fixed
effects help us to capture several potential endogeneity issues in the allocation of loans.
Region fixed effects allow us to control for time-invariant region-specific factors, while time
fixed effects capture time-variant shocks that affect regions similarly. Importantly, our
design with regional variation allows the inclusion of country-by-year fixed effects, which
account for time-variant macroeconomic shocks such as national fiscal and monetary
policy changes that affect countries differently but regions within a country similarly.
3.2 Distributed Lag Model
We use a distributed lag model to study the timing of the effect of having a representative
at the EIB Board on lending. In so doing, we include pre-trends of joining and lags of
leaving the Board and, following Fabre and Sangnier (2017), separate treatment dummies
for the first three years the Board member is in office and a fourth dummy for the
remainder of the time in office. The equation is as follows:
EIB loansijt = α1 +
−1∑
w=−4
βw1st year Board
w
ijt +
3∑
w=1
γwin office year
w
ijt
+γ41X>4 +
1∑
w=4
δwLwlast year Boardijt + κ1 ·Xijt + φt + ψij + µtj + ijt
where 1X>4

1 if in office yearijt > 4
0 otherwise
(2)
The expression
∑−1
w=−4 βw1st year Board
w
ijt defines the four pre-trends of the entry
of each Board member.
∑3
w=1 γwin office year
w
ijt are dummies for the first, second and
third year in office. 1X>4 is a dummy for being in office the fourth and any further year.
19See section 2 for details.
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Finally,
∑1
w=4 δwLwlast year Boardijt stands for four lags of the exit of the Board. The
rest of the variables are the same as in Equation 1.
4 Results
4.1 Baseline Results
In this section we present our baseline analysis on whether regional favoritism affects the
distribution of EIB lending to European regions. We start by discussion the estimation
results of the difference-in-difference model as shown in Table 3, then proceed to discussing
the results of the distributed lag model as plotted in Figure 5. In both cases the treatment
variable captures whether a region has a “representative” in the EIB’s decisive body, its
Board of Directors. This variable takes a dummy equal to one if at least one Board
member has worked in a given NUTS 2 region, and is 0 otherwise.
Columns 1-5 of Table 3 show the extensive margin results for the work region, where
the dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether a region received at least one EIB
loan in a given year or not. The evidence supports the hypothesis that the treated regions
receive more EIB loans compared to regions that do not have a representative at the EIB
Board. This extensive margin effect is robust across the specifications of Table 3.20 The
size of the effect is an increase of 14 to 21 percentage points in the likelihood of receiving
a loan. The average underlying probability that a region receives any lending is between
23% and 42%. Therefore, the home-bias effect amounts to a large 40-61% increase in the
probability of lending compared to the sample mean.
20The first column estimates our specification on the full sample starting in 1959. The sample for
the rest of the table is restricted to the post-1990 period. This is the period when control variables
are available for all regions. All regressions in Table 3 include the full set of fixed effects. Column 4
additionally includes a region-specific linear time trend to account for the possibility that regions develop
differently over time. In addition to controlling for contemporaneous GDP as part of our standrad set of
control variable, Column 5 additionaly includes the moving 5-year average of GDP per capita in the 5
years proceeding the treatment year. This is done to make sure it is not the cofinancing of EU Structural
and Investment Funds that drives our results.
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Table 3: Baseline: Regional favoritism in the allocation of EIB loans
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLE EIB Loan Dummy Ln loans
Loans /
GDP
Loans /
Tot. Loans
Work region dummy 0.1457*** 0.1768*** 0.1712*** 0.2064*** 0.1776*** -0.0256 0.9834*** 0.6050**
(0.0487) (0.0462) (0.0521) (0.0762) (0.0513) (0.2533) (0.3124) (0.2786)
Ln population 0.4608* -0.3558 0.6064** 1.4334 -0.2290 -0.5164
(0.2381) (0.6956) (0.2351) (1.2371) (1.0254) (0.8516)
Ln GDP 0.1299 -0.4264*** 2.1337*** 2.7845***
(0.1337) (0.1635) (0.7535) (0.5775)
Ln GDP p.c. t− 6 to t− 1 0.1204
(0.1228)
Hours worked per employee 0.4395* -0.2512 0.4527* 0.1459 -0.0700 -2.1312*
(0.2427) (0.3430) (0.2437) (1.8445) (1.0652) (1.1477)
Compensation per employee 0.0009 0.0061 0.0016 0.0205 -0.0523*** -0.0305*
(0.0045) (0.0048) (0.0045) (0.0171) (0.0192) (0.0168)
Ln gross fixed capital formation -0.0794 0.1253 -0.0755 0.1262 1.4807*** 0.7588***
(0.0511) (0.0822) (0.0532) (0.3782) (0.2297) (0.2746)
Sample start year 1959 1990 1990 1990 1990 1990 1990 1990
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS PPML PPML
Region-specific time trend ×
Region FEs × × × × × × × ×
Year FEs × × × × × × × ×
Country-year FEs × × × × ×
Observations 16,530 7,540 6,642 6,642 6,581 2,782 6,442 6,442
R-squared 0.3844 0.2557 0.2540 0.3268 0.2526 0.2992 0.1910 0.4429
Number of regions 290 290 266 266 266 258 258 258
Mean of dependent variable .25 .39 .42 .42 .42 4.18 .0017 .0039
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The table presents results for the estimation of the model in equation 1. Standard
errors are in parentheses and clustered on the level of NUTS 2 regions.
In column 6 of Table 3, we study the intensive margin, that is we ask whether
treated regions receive larger EIB loans given that they received at least one loan. For
the dependent variable, we take the (log) size of all lending aggregated to the region-year
level. As a result regions with no EIB loans in a certain year are dropped from the sample.
The estimated intensive margin result is small and not distinguishable from zero.
Columns 7 and 8 of Table 3 combine the extensive and intensive margins and use a
Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood (PPML) estimator.21 As outcomes variables, we use
the loans-over-GDP ratio as well as study the share of loans in total loans. The home-bias
effect is positive and statistically significant in both cases. The sizes of the coefficients
21Note that in these regressions, the country-fixed effects are left out due to computational reasons.
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are interpreted as a 98% increase in the loans-over-GDP ratio and a 61% percent increase
in the share of loans in total loans, respectively. This effect is larger than the one for
the extensive margin, however, the sample means in these specifications are very small,
0.17% and 0.39%, respectively.
We now proceed to the estimation results of the distributed lag model as specified
in equation 2. Given the findings of Table 3 we focus on the extensive margin response.
In particular, we are interested in the timing of this effect. Figure 5 shows that the
treatment effect becomes positive and remains so during the whole tenure. The point
estimates are large22 and statistically significant in all but one year of tenure. Once the
Director has left the Board, the point estimates drop almost immediately and are not
statistically significant anymore indicating that the home bias effect is only present during
the Director’s tenure. The immediate effects is plausible because our outcome variable
measures lending commitments rather than their actual disbursement. The trends prior
to the treatment are not significantly different from zero in any of the four lags that we
estimate.23 The full regression results corresponding to Figure 5 are reported in Table
A1 of the Appendix.
Figure 5 replicates the estimation for both the full sample since 1959 without control
variables and the post-1990 sample where the control variables are available. The results
look very similar, which is not surprising given that the EIB started to lend actively
starting from the 1980s. Therefore, we rely on the post-1990 sample and benefit from the
availability of control variables for all of our analyses that follows.
22The treatment effects in Figure 5 are larger than the baseline estimates of Table 3. One reason is
that the figure shows the treatment on the individual Board member level and not on the region level as
in the baseline regressions. For example, if a region is treated by two Board Directors who follow each
others term, the dummy for the first year of treatment switches on for both of the Directors.
23The point estimate in t − 1 is positive and larger than the one in t − 2, which might indicate a
pre-trend, but it has a small size compared to the point estimates during tenure and is in any case
statistically indistinguishable from zero.
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Figure 5: Probability of receiving a loan around the time of joining and leaving the EIB
Board
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This graph presents the estimation of equation 2. The corresponding regression table can be
found in Table A1 columns 1 and 2.
4.2 Robustness Tests
NUTS definition and clustering: To check the robustness of our results, we redo
the analysis for the extensive margin using the treatment dummy by clustering on the
NUTS 1 region instead of the NUTS 2 region, and by defining the regions as NUTS 3 or
NUTS 1 regions. The results are collected in columns 1-3 of Table 4, and are robust to
our baseline results.
Quarterly analysis: To further test the robustness of our results, we disaggregate
the data to the quarterly level. This data enables us to include country-by-year-by-
quarter fixed effects that further increase the validity of our results by controlling for
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the business-cycle on the national level. Column 4 of Table 4 shows the results for the
extensive margin. The effect is smaller in size but still statistically different from zero.
Joining the EU: Another concern with our analysis has to do with the fact that the
EU has expanded in several waves within our sample period. Even though we control
for region and country-year interacted fixed effects, this expansion may still be an issue
if the treatment regions of the small countries that join the EU are concentrated in the
capital and if these regions simultaneously benefit disproportionally more from joining
the EU. Thus, in Table 4 column 5, we include an interaction term between capital cities
and a post-EU dummy. The result is nearly identical with the baseline result in Table 3
column 3.
Capital cities: As can be seen from Figure 2, the capital cities are more likely to be
treated than other parts of countries while being economic centres they are also more
likely to be receiving loans from the EIB. Although this potential confounding effect
should be fully accounted for by the region fixed effects, we do two additional robustness
tests by excluding all regions with capital cities from the sample, or by only including
these regions in the sample. The results are collected in Table 4 columns 6 and 7. In
both instances we observe a positive and significant treatment effect.
EU Structural and Investment Funds: A further concern relates to the fact that a
large share of EIB loans co-finance the EU Structural and Investment Funds (ESI Funds).
While we controlled for the potential eligibility for such funds in Table 3 column 5, we
now conduct a more direct test. We want to analyze whether our baseline results still
hold when we control for the fact that regions received some of the ESI Funds. We rely
on annual disbursement data of the following four ESI Funds: the European Regional
Development Fund, the Cohesion Fund, the European Social Fund, and the European
Agricultural Fund for Rural Development.24 We opt for a simultaneous disbursement
24Source: https://cohesiondata.ec.europa.eu/
20
of ESI Funds and EIB treatment effects, well aware that lagged specifications might be
appropriate as well. The results in column 8 of Table 4 show no distortion of the main
treatment effects.
Spillover effects: Furthermore, we test whether neighbor regions of treated regions
also have an increased probability of receiving loans. For that purpose, we create a
spatial lag where we weight the home region dummy of the other regions by their inverse
distance. The results collected in Table 4 column 9 do not show evidence of regional
spillover effects.
Excluding countries and time periods: We analyze whether specific countries or
time periods drive the baseline results. Table A2 of the Appendix shows the baseline
estimates by dropping the 28 EU Member States one-by-one. The estimated treatment
effect is fairly stable in size (the point estimate varies from to 0.1543 to 0.1926) and is
always significantly different from zero at the 1% level. Thus, it seems that no specific
Member State is solely responsible for the baseline result.
Similarly, Table A3 drops decades or five-year periods one-by-one. When the period
from 1999 to 2008 is excluded, the treatment effect reduces by about twice in size and
becomes statistically indistinguishable from zero. However, when we exclude the first
and second five years of this decade separately, both effects are positive and significantly
different from zero. Therefore, we conclude that although it seems that much of the
favoritism that we document may be coming from the post-1999 period, we cannot say
that the result is solely driven by this period.
Model choice: We have so far used simple linear probability models when studying
the extensive margin response. Since our dependent variable is a dummy variable in
these specifications, we can interpret the expected value of the estimate as a probability.
Non-linear models provide potential benefits when the underlying model is highly non-
linear. At the same time they lead to considerable complications including the incidental
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parameter problem as well as computational difficulties. These problems especially ag-
gravate in our case, which models a large set of fixed effects, in particular due to the
inclusion of country-by-year fixed effects. Moreover, the main disadvantages of using
a linear model, that is nonsense predictions that lie out of the (0,1) range or concep-
tual arguments against linearity, do not materialize in our case. We, therefore, estimate
one computationally plausible non-linear model as a robustness test, but keep the linear
models as our baseline estimator. In particular, in Table 4 column 11, we specify a logit
regression without country-by-time fixed effects on quarterly level data (as we have used
above in column 4 of Table 4). The quarterly data has a longer time-series than the an-
nual data which somewhat downplays the incidental parameter problem. The marginal
effect of the treatment effect is slightly larger than that of the baseline model but consis-
tent in direction and significance. In addition, we note that in a number of specifications
we use Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood models.
Figure 6: Randomization inference
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The graph plots the cumulative distribution function on the y-axis and the placebo treatment
effects on the x-axis. The vertical line indicates our treatment effect reported in Table 3 column
3.
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Few treated clusters: One problem with our setting could be that the number of
treated clusters is small. With few treated clusters, inference problems can arise be-
cause the large-sample approximations for inference are no longer applicable (Conley and
Taber 2011). As the share of treated region-years is 7% for the post-1990 sample, we
conduct randomization inference by randomizing the treatment. In the original dataset,
the treated observations are distributed across 36 of 291 regions. Therefore, we conduct
a two-step randomization of treatment where in the first step 36 regions are randomly
assigned to be treated regions. Among them, we again choose the same number as treated
observations as in the “real” sample before running the specification. This randomiza-
tion inference mechanism is conducted for 1000 replications, which gives us 1000 placebo
treatment effects. We compute the cumulative distribution function of these placebo ef-
fects and compare it to our treatment effect. The resulting graph is depicted in Figure
6. The graph shows that our result is rare and that the few treated clusters are unlikely
to give rise to issues in the sense of Conley and Taber (2011) in our analysis.
4.3 Result Heterogeneity
Governing bodies: The EIB Board has 29 Full and 19 Alternate Directors. As the
name suggests, Alternate Directors mostly assist the work of the Full Directors. Also, Full
Directors represent an individual Member State while most Alternate Directors represent
a group of countries. It is, therefore, our expectation that the the home-bias of Alternate
Directors is smaller than that of the Full Directors. In Figures 7 (a) and (b), we replicate
the analysis for Full and Alternate Board members separately. As expected, we see large
and statistically significant point estimates of the treatment effect for the Full Directors
but not for the Alternate Directors. The positive lags for the Alternate Directors after
exiting EIB can be explained by the fact that some Alternates become a Full member
after their term as Alternate.
The Management Committee is the executive body of the EIB, and currently consists
of one President and eight Vice-Presidents. Since the foundation of the EIB, there have
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Figure 7: Full and Alternate Directors and Management Committee
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(b) Alternate Directors
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(c) Management Committee
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These graphs present three estimations of equation 2 where the the treatment effect is the
work region of: a) Full Directors, b) Alternate Directors, and c) Members of the Management
Committee. The corresponding regressions can be found in Table A1 columns 3-5.
been 54 members of this Committee in total including seven Presidents. We have data
on the work region prior to joining the EIB of 49 Committee members. Even though
the Management Committee of the EIB has no direct influence on the approval of loans,
anecdotal evidence suggests that these are generally influential positions within the EIB.
For example, Counter Balance (2016) reports, for instance, that Philippe de Fontaine
Vive, a Vice-President at the EIB from 2003 to 2015, joined CMA-CGM, a container
shipping conglomerate, which received a PPP-contract from EIB. He is now on the board
of BMCE Bank, which has a long association with EIB. It also reports about Gillian Day
who held senior positions at the EIB at the same time when EIB has awarded numerous
loans to the Royal Bank of Scotland where she served as Managing Director until February
2015. Moreover, this body together with the staff is also responsible for preparing the
documents for the loan approval by the Board of Directors. Figure 7 (c) plots the analysis
for the Management Committee. We observe positive and statistically significant effects
in the treatment period, which would lend support to the hypothesis that the Management
Committee not only has influence on loan approvals but also engages in home-bias lending.
However, we also note that the confidence intervals in this exercise are quite large owing
to the small number of Management Committee members.
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Capital shares: There are two complementary voting rules to reach a decision at the
EIB Board of Directors. At least one third of 29 directors where each director has one
vote has to be in favor of a decision and at the same time a simple majority of subscribed
capital has to approve it. This means that the higher the capital share of a country
the Board member represents, the higher is the respective voting power. In addition to
our treatment dummy variable, we interact this dummy with the capital share of each
member country to reflect the respective country-specific weights in the voting rule. The
capital shares of all countries are recalculated every time a new country enters. If several
members are attached to the same regions at the same time, we use the maximum capital
share of these members.
Figure 8: Marginal effects of capital shares
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This graph presents the estimation of equation 1 with interaction effects of the treatment dummy
for the work region with the respective capital shares. The regression is reported in Table 4
column 10.
In Figure 8, we plot the marginal effects of the work region dummy for different
capital share sizes. The corresponding regression is depicted in Table 4 column 10. The
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interaction effect is not statistically significant and the confidence intervals in the graph
are quite large so that the positive slope of the treatment effecr is also statistically in-
significant. Hence, we do not have evidence to argue that the size of the capital share
a Board members represents is positively realted to the probability that treated regions
receive loans.
5 Potential Mechanisms
After having documented the body of evidence on the existence of the home-bias effect in
lending, the crucial question is whether these discriminatory lending practices facilitate
economic efficiency or whether they result in inefficient misallocation of resources. As
discussed in Section 1, the two main mechanism that predict a larger flow of transactions
into the home regions are that this lending is either driven by favoritism or by the
information advantage of Directors. Both of these potential mechanisms are consistent
with our evidence, however, they have divergent predictions on the economic value of these
transactions. While favoritism-driven lending will arguably lead to resource misallocation,
lending due to a potential information advantage of Directors regarding their home regions
may enhance efficiency. The net welfare effects of home-bias can therefore be both positive
or negative depending on the relative strength of either of these two channels. In this
section, we design a number of indirect tests to try to isolate the two motives behind
lending decisions.
Sector and project size: First, we study potential treatment heterogeneity along the
size distribution of loans as well as along six broad sectors that our data captures.25 This
exercise allows us to identify on a more granular level the types of projects that drive the
finding of home-bias. This is an interesting exercise by itself, and may additionally be
informative about the mechanisms in play.
25These sectors are: Agriculture, Industry, Energy, Infrastructure, Non-market services, and Services.
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For the latter case of sectors, we estimate Equation 1 with the dependent variable
being a dummy of having at least one loan in a certain sector. The results are collected
in Table 5. Column 1 shows the treatment effects by sector for the extensive margin
independent of the project size. The home-bias is only present for infrastructure projects.
The effect of 13 percentage points translates to an increase of 46% compared to the sample
mean, which is in line with our baseline result. We then we split the approved loans into
quartiles according to their size within each sector. To control for differences between
poor and rich countries, and size effects over time, we classify the loans into quartiles
depending on the country and decade. Columns 2 to 5 of Table 5 show the treatment
effects per quartile and sector. For the infrastructure sector, the treatment effects are
positive and statistically significant for projects above the median.26
Similiar to our baseline analysis, columns 6 and 7 of Table 5 extend the sector-specific
results to the intensive margin analysis of looking at, respectively, the number of loans
and log loan sizes. Infrastructure is the only sector where we find significant treatment
effects in both columns.27 The magnitudes are large and can be interpreted as an increase
of 120% in the number of loans (or 0.9 more loans compared to the mean of 0.75 loans)
or a 116% increase in the size of infrastructure loans. This evidence that on the intensive
margin
Although not a direct test, this evidence that the home-bias phenomenon is driven by
infrastructural mega-projects may hint towards favoritism rather than an informational
channel, as the need for these large projects is rather common knowledge than the need
for smaller and more sophisticated projects. Papers by Do et al. (2017), Persson and
Zhuravskaya (2016) find similar evidence for construction infrastructure in Vietnam and
China, respectively.
26In this matrix of 24 treatment estimates, we see one (three) more point estimates that are different
from zero at the 5 (10%) level, which however do not show a meaningful pattern of effects on size within
other industries.
27The energy sector has a positive significant point estimate in column 6 which is not robust to the
evidence in column 7. The agricultural sector has an implausible large significant effect in column 6
which is an artifact of having too few observations left after splitting the sample by sector size. As a
result the estimation for agriculture in colum 7 is not identified.
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Job switchers: As a second test of mechanism, we collect additional data on the work
regions of Directors after their service at the EIB,28 and limit the analysis to a sub-sample
of Directors who switch jobs. We then separately study the probability of switchers to
lend money to either their pre-EIB regions or the new post-EIB regions while in office at
the Board. The assumption behind this test is that a Director who has not yet worked in
a certain region does not have an information advantage about that region, while sending
money to a pre-EIB region can be a mix of both the favoritism and information channels.
Figure 9: Tests for mechanisms: Job switchers
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This graph presents the estimation of Equation 2. The corresponding regression can be found
in Table A1 columns 6 and 7.
Figure 9 is estimated with Equation 2 and identifies the timing of effects of job-
switchers serving at the EIB Board on lending to either their pre-EIB regions or their new
28The CVs we have of the Board members do not cover the period after working at the EIB. Hence,
we collected information on the workplace after the time at the EIB via manual internet search. In so
doing, we find information on 132 Board members working at the EIB after 1990, who make around 40%
of the sample of Directors over the same period. For the rest of the Directors, including those who served
at the EIB before 1990, we fail to find reliable career information. Out of the 132 Director for whom we
have data, 68 stayed in the same region and 64 switched to new regions, of which 51 are within the EU.
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post-EIB regions. The results for the old regions are positive and statistically significant
in the treatment, but not in the pre-treatment periods, which confirms our baseline
result on this sub-sample limited to job switchers. If information advantage was the
main mechanism at play, we would expect the entire home-bias effects to be driven by
the transfers to old regions and nearly zero transfers flowing to the new regions. In
contrast, Figure 9 does not find a precise zero effect on transfers to these regions. The
point estimates of lending to new post-EIB regions are increasing with tenure at the
Board and they reach near-statistical significance at end of the period. This evidence is
weak possibly due to the few number of switchers in our sample, but the very least it
does not reject the null hypothesis that Directors are unable to send transfers to regions
over which they are unlikely to have any observable informational advantages.
Degree of information: Third, we follow Fisman et al. (2017), Persson and Zhu-
ravskaya (2016), Rajan (1992) and hypothesize that the degree of information a Director
has about a region should be positively correlated with the amount of home-bias lend-
ing. Similar to this work, we measure the degree of information by Directors’ length of
experience in years at the region..29 Column 1 of Table 6 adds a variable capturing the
number of years in work regions to our baseline specification. Next, we limit the sample
to treated observation only, and in columns 2 and 3 of Table 6 test whether treatment
effects are heterogeneous in this sub-sample according to, respectively, the number of
years of experience as a continuous variable or an indicator function specifying several
intervals of the experience variable. None of these tests confirms the hypothesis that
more experience, a likely correlate of information, drives more lending.
Loan size dispersion: Fourth, we follow Cornell and Welch (1996) and Fisman et al.
(2017) and hypothesize that informed Directors should have higher precision signals about
29As explained in section 2, a large share of the work region variable was collected via annual reports
of the EIB. This source does not provide with the years the Directors have already spent in one region.
Therefore, we tried to complement the information of the CVs by manual Google search. In the end, we
know the experience in one region for 202 Directors.
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the creditworthiness of borrowers originating from their home regions which would in-
crease the variance of the distribution of priors across these borrowers. This hypothesis
of higher variance of priors leads to the testable prediction that the dispersion of loan
sizes flowing to home regions are higher than those of loans going to other regions. We
adopt our baseline specification and instead of the dependent variable in columns 4 and
5 of Table 6 take as measures of loan dispersion the (log of) inter-quartile range and the
standard deviation of loan sizes per region and year, respectively. The sample is limited
to region-year observations having two and more loans. This evidence again fails to find
any support that the information mechanism is the main driver of the home-bias lending.
Social preferences: Ruling out the information channel as the main mechanism at
play tells us that this type of lending is not likely to be welfare enhancing. However,
even if we could entirely rule out the information mechanism, the favoritism explanation
would not be the only remaining explanation. One competing explanation, as advanced
for example by Do et al. (2017) in a different context, is that Directors may simply
have social preferences towards their home regions. There may be various alternative
explanations as well, but to the degree that we are aware of the literature this and other
mechanism are all likely to lead to misallocation of resources.
Nevertheless, in a final step, we follow Persson and Zhuravskaya (2016) and exploit
the timing of formation of the home-bias assuming that social preferences towards a
region are likely to take shape before the last region of work and perhaps much closer
to years of early adulthood. For a sub-sample of 263 Directors, we are able to code the
regions of education. Columns 6 to 9 of Table 6 then asks whether the additional lending
is flowing to regions of Directors’ workplace rather than their education regions.30 Our
evidence seems to be driven by regions of workplace rather that of education, which may
30We do several tests to make sure that the positive effect for the work region and the absence for the
education region is not driven by the poor availability of the education variable. In column 7, we first
include both treatment effects together. In columns 8-9, we only include the Directors for which both
the education and work region are available. The effects do not change.
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Table 6: Tests for mechanisms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
VARIABLES Loan dummy Ln IQR Ln Std. Dev. Loan dummy
Work region dummy in t 0.1419** 0.4911 0.4392 0.1564*** 0.1090** 0.1251**
(0.0585) (0.4908) (0.3920) (0.0585) (0.0545) (0.0496)
Education region dummy in t 0.0534 0.0340 0.0283
(0.0364) (0.0390) (0.0392)
Experience in work region 0.0069 0.0061
(0.0054) (0.0045)
region experience - reference: 0 years
1-3 years -0.1150
(0.2361)
4-6 years -0.5602
(0.6629)
7-9 years 0.0160
(0.2227)
10-12 years 0.2301
(0.4267)
12+ years 0.1995
(0.1242)
Sample start year 1990 1990 1990 1990 1990 1990 1990 1990 1990
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Sample full treatment = 1 without zero loans full full both regions known
Control variables included × × × × × × × × ×
Region FEs × × × × × × × × ×
Year FEs × × × × × × × × ×
Country-year FEs × × × × × × × × ×
Observations 6,642 470 470 1,600 1,600 6.642 6,642 6,642 6,642
R-squared 0.2547 0.9042 0.9081 0.4003 0.3934 0.2528 0.2542 0.2537 0.2535
Number of regions 266 29 29 221 221 266 266 266 266
Dependent variable mean .42 .68 .68 17.03 16.79 0,42 .42 .42 .42
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The table presents results for the estimation of the model in equation 1. Standard
errors are in parentheses.
speak against the hypothesis that favoritism is driven by social preferences rather than
personal gain.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we study political economy aspects of lending decisions within the Euro-
pean Investment Bank. This is an important extension of the literature on the political
economy of international organizations for at least two reasons. First, the EIB is the
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largest multilateral lending institution in the world, and thus an important case study
by itself. Second, the EIB is closely nested within the larger framework of the European
Union institutions, thus this paper may have wider relevance for policy reform in the EU.
We documents that Member State-nominated technocrats governing the Bank favor
their home regions by allocating more EIB lending towards these regions. Our evidence
does not provide a definitive answer to the crucial question of whether this bias is eco-
nomically inefficient. However, we think that the question of whether favoritism plays
a role in resource allocation decisions at the EU and particularly at the EIB deserves a
further debate.
In particular, the EIB may benefit by increasing the level of transparency in its
decision making processes. This is in line with ongoing calls to reform EIB institutions,
such as by introducing stronger rules for the disclosure of conflict of interest by the EIB
Board of Directors and other senior staff. This evidence also stresses the important role
to be given to debates on institutional reforms for the EU’s various financing instruments
before any further and more complex arrangements are established. The well-known
accountability problems in the EU cannot be solved by simply delegating authority to
technocrats who are often perceived to be rather independent of political constraints
given the absence of electoral incentives.
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Appendix: Additional Tables
Table A1: Results from the distributed lag model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES EIB Loan Dummy
First year in office in t− 4 0.0353 0.0490 0.0441 0.0336 0.1376** 0.1314 -0.0240
(0.0251) (0.0346) (0.0382) (0.0386) (0.0633) (0.0807) (0.0494)
First year in office in t− 3 -0.0404 -0.0570 -0.1006** 0.0105 0.0299 0.0058 -0.0043
(0.0282) (0.0376) (0.0442) (0.0462) (0.0917) (0.0681) (0.0944)
First year in office in t− 2 -0.0373 -0.0203 -0.0053 0.0103 0.1568 0.0188 0.0856
(0.0262) (0.0481) (0.0357) (0.0771) (0.1112) (0.0810) (0.0761)
First year in office in t− 1 0.0302 0.0638 0.0744 0.0450 0.1403 0.0743 0.1068
(0.0334) (0.0533) (0.0567) (0.0674) (0.0902) (0.0975) (0.0848)
First year in office 0.1234 0.1266 0,1506 -0.0487 0.2373** 0.0956 -0.1562
(0.0879) (0.1100) (0.1341) (0.0822) (0.1058) (0.1247) (0.1324)
Second year in office 0.2157** 0.1979** 0.2231** 0.0088 0.2851** 0.2094** -0.0921
(0.0778) (0.0834) (0.0990) (0.0694) (0.1269) (0.0973) (0.1114)
Third year in office 0.2584*** 0.2717*** 0.3025*** -0.0020 0.2802** 0.1822** 0.0983
(0.0591) (0.0761) (0.0749) (0.0895) (0.1085) (0.0890) (0.1969)
Fourth year or more in office 0.1529** 0.1355* 0.0482 0.1033 0.1870* 0.1169 0.1360
(0.0619) (0.0737) (0.0595) (0.0752) (0.0978) (0.0725) (0.0953)
Last year in office in t+ 1 -0.0047 0.0683 0.0182 0.1229* 0.2746*** 0.0690 0.1323
(0.0423) (0.0540) (0.0758) (0.0632) (0.0880) (0.0911) (0.2027)
Last year in office in t+ 2 -0.0581 0.0210 -0.0701 0.1336** 0.2406* -0.0105 0.0989
(0.0458) (0.0581) (0.0854) (0.0560) (0.1313) (0.0780) (0.1940)
Last year in office in t+ 3 -0.0249 0.0166 0.0095 0.0691 0.0911 0.0094 0.1978**
(0.0538) (0.0637) (0.0767) (0.0676) (0.1031) (0.0547) (0.0869)
Last year in office in t+ 4 0.0120 0.0624 0.0292 0.0737 0.1236* -0.0516 0.1950
(0.0387) (0.0431) (0.0708) (0.0529) (0.0695) (0.0847) (0.1530)
Ln population 0.4522* 0.4467* 0.4211 0.3732 0.4707 0.4076
(0.2647) (0.2649) (0.2645) (0.2635) (0.3180) (0.3188)
Ln GDP 0.1365 0.1554 0.2021 0.1789 0.2708 0.3030*
(0.1350) (0.1364) (0.1423) (0.1357) (0.1647) (0.1623)
Hours worked per employee 0.4153* 0.4121 0.3997 0.3461 0.4123* 0.3905
(0.2472) (0.2499) (0.2487) (0.2409) (0.2443) (0.2409)
Compensation per employee 0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0025
(0.0051) (0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0051) (0.0057) (0.0051)
Ln gross fixed capital formation -0.0764 -0.0742 -0.0827 -0.0647 0.0163 0.0212
(0.0590) (0.0603) (0.0625) (0.0597) (0.0704) (0.0730)
Sample start year 1959 1990 1990 1990 1990 1990 1990
Sample Full and Alternate Full Alternate MC old regions post regions
Region FEs × × × × × × ×
Year FEs × × × × × × ×
Country-year FEs × × × × × × ×
Observations 14,210 5,844 5,844 5,844 5,844 4,788 4,788
R-squared 0.3632 0.2563 0.2562 0.2535 0.2558 0.2191 0.2197
Number of regions 290 266 266 266 266 266 266
Mean of the dependent variable .25 .41 .41 .41 .41 .42 .42
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The table presents results for the estimation of the model in equation 2. Standard
errors are in parentheses.
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Table A3: Drop ten and five year periods one-by-one
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES EIB Loan Dummy
Work region dummy 0.1516*** 0.1467*** 0.1461*** 0.1634*** 0.1490*** 0.1548*** 0.1619*** 0.1505***
(0.0483) (0.0483) (0.0487) (0.0475) (0.0484) (0.0495) (0.0462) (0.0493)
Without years 59-68 59-63 64-68 69-78 69-73 74-78 79-88 79-83
Observations 13,630 15,080 15,080 13,630 15,080 15,080 13,630 15,080
R-squared 0.4079 0.4343 0.4369 0.4114 0.4359 0.4382 0.4697 0.4607
Mean of dependent variable .27 .25 .25 .27 .25 .25 .23 .23
Work region dummy 0.1533*** 0.1601*** 0.1520*** 0.1470*** 0.0785 0.1349*** 0.0991* 0.1234*
(0.0463) (0.0415) (0.0445) (0.0466) (0.0601) (0.0500) (0.0587) (0.0709)
Without years 84-88 89-98 89-93 94-98 99-08 99-03 04-08 09-15
Observations 15,080 13,630 15,080 15,080 13,630 15,080 15,080 14,500
R-squared 0.4642 0.4573 0.4525 0.4626 0.5023 0.4724 0.4803 0.4638
Mean of dependent variable .22 .2 .22 .21 .2 .21 .21 .19
Number of regions 290 290 290 290 290 290 290 290
Region FEs × × × × × × × ×
Year FEs × × × × × × × ×
Country-year FEs × × × × × × × ×
Controls
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The table presents results for the estimation of the model in equation 1. Standard
errors are in parentheses.
Online Data Appendix
• We use three sets of data:
– Project-level data on EIB loans (N=12,691)31: includes the size of loans, time
of commitment, region (i.e., NUTS) identifier, name of project, sector, etc.32
– Person-level data on EIB Board of Directors (N=470): regions of workplace
for all 470 Directors33 and regions of education of highest degree for 262 Di-
rectors.34
– Region-level data on socio-economic characteristics: includes GDP, popula-
tion, etc.35
• We aggregate our data to the level of European regions:
– We use the NUTS 2 level of aggregation (classification as of 2010).36
– This gives us 291 regions in total.37
– The sample starts in 1959 and ends in 2015.
– In total, we have a balanced sample of 16,587 observations.
– For summary statistics see Table A4 below.
• Do file:
– The do file Asatryan Havlik EIB dofile.do, first, aggregates the raw project-
and person-level data into region-level data, and
31See also Table 1.
32The source of this data is the EIB.
33The work region was hand-collected from 157 CVs provided by the EIB, and for the remaining 313
Directors it was complemented with data collected from EIB annual reports available in the Historical
Archives of the European Union (https://archives.eui.eu/en/fonds/30462?item=BEI). We have
full coverage for this variable.
34The education region was likewise hand-collected via the CVs and augmented via a manual Google
search. Here, we have a partial coverage of only 262 Directors.
35This database is called the European Regional Database and it was purchased from Cambridge
Economics. We do not have the right to publish this data.
36The countries Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are exceptions where we use the NUTS 3 aggregation.
37Brussels region will we dropped from the analysis (NUTS code BE10) as explained in Section 2.
45
– secondly, estimates the baseline specifications of i) Table 3 Column 1, and ii)
Figure 5.38
• The data and do files are available for download at:
– http://ftp.zew.de/pub/persons/ZarehAsatryan/EIB/
• When using this data please cite:
– Asatryan, Zareh and Annika Havlik (2019). The Political Economy of Multi-
lateral Lending to European Regions. ZEW Discussion Paper No. 19-046.
38We make available only the baseline results since other results of the paper use the confidential
European Regional Database.
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